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Abstract 
Through the prism of external governance, this paper investigates the 
emergence of the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) as an external mode of 
sectoral governance and its actual capacity to cope with the regulatory gap-
problem between the European Union (EU) and Mediterranean Partner 
Countries (MPCs). Although network forms of energy governance generally 
prevail in the EU and the Mediterranean region, the solar plan emerges as a 
very loosely institutionalized form of market governance in which political 
interaction and outcomes are the result of inter-MPCs competition over 
external funding. This paper shows that competitive pressure at best 
unleashes a reform dynamic in which individual MPCs undertake partial 
regulatory and institutional reforms in order to ‘lock in’ funding and long-
term power purchase agreements. But, market governance under the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan is far to provoke a region-wide renewable energy 
transition. The discontinuity between the internal-external mode of energy 
governance and external governance under the Mediterranean Solar Plan is 
attributed to early choices of key member states (France and Germany) 
within the making of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) - facts that 
ultimately impacted on the resulting sectoral patterns of external governance, 
thus constraining the potential and limits of the Mediterranean Solar Plan to 
reduce the EU-MPCs regulatory gap. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) devotes significant effort and resources to 
cope with the energy-climate problem. Today, energy-related carbon 
dioxide emissions amount to nearly 80 percent of European greenhouse 
gas emissions.1 This picture does not get any better if one considers that 
EU energy demand increases every year (although at a relatively slow 
pace) along with EU import dependency on fossil fuels. According to 
data of the European Commission, in 2005 a 76 percent of the EU total 
primary energy demand was covered by fossil fuels – that is, climate 
unfriendly energy sources.2 A 68 percent of these fossil fuels was 
imported from non-EU countries.3 In a baseline scenario for 2020, nearly 
78 percent of the EU total primary energy demand will be covered by 
fossil fuels of which an 84 percent will be imported from non-EU 
countries.4 In response to these concerns, the Union adopted an integrated 
energy and climate policy approach at the European Council in March 
2007 and is presently implementing new EU-level policies to reach its 
ambitious objectives to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by 20% below 
1990 levels, lessen energy consumption by 20% through increased 
energy efficiency, and raise the share of renewable energy in the EU’s 
energy mix to 20% by 2020.  
In this context, the EU launched the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) 
as one of the priority projects of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 
at the Paris Summit in July 2008. This project-oriented foreign policy 
initiative aims to cope with the energy-climate problem at interregional 
level and adds another ‘20-objective’ to the ground. Its two-fold scope is 
to (a) develop 20 Gigawatts of installed renewable energy capacity in the 
Mediterranean region by 2020 along with the necessary electricity 
transmission capacity and cross-border interconnections and (b) promote 
energy efficiency policies in this region. With respect to the renewable 
energy transition goal inherent in the MSP, top officials spelled out a 
clear message at the European Investment Bank’s eighth FEMIP (Facility 
                                                 
1 European Commission (2010), Communication from the Commission. Energy 
2020: A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM(2010) 639 
final, Brussels, page 1. 
2 Own calculations based on data of the European Commission (2008), Commission 
Staff Working Document, accompanying the Communication from the Commission. 
Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU energy security and solidarity action plan. 
Europe's current and future energy position: demand – resources – investments, 
COM(2008) 781 final, Brussels, page 65. 
3 Ibidem.  
4 Ibidem. 
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for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership) conference and the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan conference jointly held in Valencia in May 
2010. Three are the key barriers to the deployment of the MSP: 
regulatory, financial, and technical. Interestingly, the actor constellation 
involved in the MSP has mainly concentrated on assessing the level of 
maturity of the existing renewable energy projects in the different MPCs, 
the economic viability of planned projects, and the main technical and 
financial obstacles concerning their implementation. While many experts 
and academicians have warned about the importance of closing the 
regulatory gap between the EU and Mediterranean Partner Countries 
(MPCs) in order to leverage the attraction of private investment and 
realise a wide renewable energy transition in the Middle East and North 
Africa,5 this topic has been largely neglected.  
Drawing on external governance theories, this paper investigates            
(i) the emergence of the Mediterranean Solar Plan as an external mode of 
sectoral governance and the role of agency therein (theory-testing scope), 
as well as (ii) the actual capacity of the solar plan to thoroughly manage 
the EU-MPCs regulatory gap-problem and boost a region-wide 
institutional and regulatory reform dynamic (policy-oriented scope). As it 
will be shown in this paper, there is a discrepancy between the internal-
external mode of sectoral governance and the specific mode of 
interaction under which the Mediterranean Solar Plan is framed. While 
network governance prevails in the former two levels (internal-external), 
market governance takes centre stage in the MSP. This paper will explain 
this discrepancy with an eye at the role of member states within EU 
policy-making processes. More in detail, member states are conceived of 
                                                 
5 European Investment Bank (2010), FEMIP Study on the Financing of Renewable 
Energy Investment in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Region, 
Luxembourg, page 17, available at 
http://www.eib.org/attachments/country/study_msp_en.pdf (accessed on 26 
November 2010). M. Mason (2009), ‘Clean Power from the Deserts? The Prospects 
for a Renewable Energy Transition for the Middle East and North Africa’, Paper 
presented at the GCREEDER 2009, Amman, March 31-April 2 2009. J.M. Marín 
and G. Escribano (2010), ‘The Mediterranean Solar Plan: Opportunities and Limits 
for Integration and Development’, in IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook Med.2010, 
European Institute of the Mediterranean, Barcelona, pages 220-22, available at 
http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/Marin_Escribano_Solar_en.pdf. 
Resources and Logistics (2010), Identification Mission for the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan, Final Report, ENPI-FWC Beneficiaries Lot 4-N° 2008/168828, Brussels, page 
65. I. Werenfels and K. Westphal (2010), ‘Solar power from North Africa. 
Frameworks and Prospects’, SWP Research Paper 2010/RP 03, SWP, Berlin, page 
16. G. Escribano (2010), ‘Convergence towards differentiation: the case of 
Mediterranean energy corridors’, Mediterranean Politics 15(2): 211-29. 
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as strategic actors who bump in institutions and seek to mould particular 
aspects of external governance according to their own interests. However, 
this is not without costs. This paper will illustrate that early choices of 
key member states (France and Germany) within the making of the UfM 
had remarkable implications in external governance under the MSP – 
facts that ultimately constrain the potential and limits of the solar plan to 
reduce the above regulatory gap-problem. Market governance under the 
MSP at best unleashes a reform dynamic in which MPCs undertake 
partial regulatory and institutional reforms in order to ‘lock in’ scarce 
external funding and long-term power purchase agreements. But, these 
forms of competitive pressure are far to provoke a wide renewable energy 
transition in the Mediterranean region.  
This paper proceeds in three steps. It briefly introduces the 
theoretical base of the enquiry. It then explores the continuities and 
discontinuities between the internal mode of energy governance, the 
prevailing external mode of energy governance in the Mediterranean 
region and the specific mode of interaction under which the solar plan is 
framed. It finally scrutinizes the reasons for this variation and unravels 
the ensuing structural limits of the Mediterranean Solar Plan in tackling 
the EU-MPCs regulatory gap-problem. 
 
2.  The prism of external governance 
EU external governance is a flourishing research theme with deep roots 
in debates in international relations and comparative politics. The term 
“governance” implies a system of rules which exceeds the voluntarism of 
cooperation, and can be defined as being less than “government” but 
more than “cooperation”.6 When applied to EU external relations, studies 
of external governance refuse the projection of the unitary state actor 
model on to the European Union and move to examines more structural 
processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer to third countries and 
international organizations.7 By so doing, external governance analysis 
has greatly contributed to a better understanding of EU external relations 
by capturing the sectorally fragmented, differentiated, expanding scope 
of EU rules, policies and institutions to third countries. 
                                                 
6 Lavenex, S. (2008), ‘A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood 
policy: integration beyond conditionality?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 
15(6), page 940.  
7 Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009), ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: 
theorizing external governance in European politics’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, 16(6), page 794. 
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The bulk of this literature, which has mostly dealt with enlargement 
to Central and Eastern European countries and with neighbouring 
policies and regions, has investigated (a) the modes of external 
governance, i.e. the modes in which the EU interact with and seeks to 
extend its rules, policies and institutions to third countries as well as (b) 
the effectiveness of external governance, i.e. the conditions under which 
EU efforts at expanding governance beyond EU borders prove to be 
effective at the levels of rule selection in international agreements and 
negotiations, rule adoption in third countries’ domestic legislation and 
rule application in the target countries.8 For the sake of clarity, this paper 
relates to the former pattern of research – thus investigating the modes of 
external governance, and primarily the EU roots and dynamics behind 
their emergence. The study of effectiveness is left aside because of the 
too recent inception of the MSP. 
The underlying assumption of external governance theories is that 
interdependence problems between political units (here the EU and 
MPCs) generate demand for governance. This means that modes of 
external governance can be conceived of as structures through which 
political units manage this interdependence.9 More concretely, the modes 
of external governance can be described as institutional forms of 
interaction with third countries through which the EU seeks to expand its 
regulatory and organizational boundaries beyond EU borders. Shifts in 
the regulatory boundary pertain to the extension of EU rules and policies 
to third countries, while shifts in the organizational boundary relate to 
the inclusion of third countries in EU policy-making structures.10 
According to the literature, the modes of external governance create 
opportunities and constraints on actors’ forms of interaction and have 
implications on the mechanisms of regulatory/organizational boundary 
expansion.11 In other words, the modes of external governance constrain 
the boundaries of action and interaction.  
To depict the specific features of external governance modes, this 
paper uses four analytical dimensions developed in the literature: actor 
                                                 
8 See special issues and articles in Journal of European Public Policy (JEPP) (2004), 
11(4); JEPP (2008), 15(6); JEPP (2009), 16(6).  
9 See S. Lavenex, et. al. (2009), ‘Modes of external governance: a cross-national and 
cross-sectoral comparison’, Journal of European Public Policy 16(6), page 814. 
10 Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009), ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: 
theorizing external governance in European politics’, op.cit., page 796. 
11 Ib. 
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constellation, legalization, institutionalization and mechanisms of 
external governance.12  
 
Table 1: Modes of EU external governance13 
 Hierarchy Network Market 
Actor constellation 
Direction 
Type of main 
actors 
 
Vertical constellation 
EU institutions and third 
countries’ governments 
 
Horizontal constellation 
Transgovernmental and 
transnational networks 
 
Horizontal constellation 
Transnational networks 
and governments 
Legalization 
Precision 
Obligation 
 
Delegation 
 
Same precision as acquis 
Supranational law or 
legally binding obligations  
Judicial control 
 
Acquis but with flexibility
International law or    
voluntary agreement 
Political monitoring 
 
Subject to negotiation 
No legally binding 
obligation  
No monitoring 
Institutionalization 
Centralization 
Density 
Exclusiveness 
 
Tight 
High 
EU agenda 
 
Loose 
Medium 
Common agenda 
 
Decentralized 
Ad hoc 
Common agenda 
Mechanism of 
external governance Harmonization Coordination Competition  
 
Actor constellation refers to the type of actors (EU institutions, 
governments, international organizations, transgovernmental networks, 
agencies, transnational networks and private actors) that are linked to 
external governance structures as well as the direction of interactions 
(vertical or horizontal). Legalization refers to the way in which systems 
of rules are linked to external governance modes, and varies according to 
the three rule criteria: precision (i.e. the degree to which rules attain the 
conduct of actors) obligation (i.e. the degree to which actors are bound by 
a rule or a set of rules) and delegation (i.e. the delegation of the authority 
to implement, interpret and apply rules to third countries).14 
                                                 
12 S. Lavenex, et. al. (2007), ‘Die Nachbarschaftspolitiken der Europäischen Union: 
zwischen Hegemonie und erweiteter Governance’ In Ingeborg Tömmel (ed.) Die 
Europäische Union: Governance und Policy-Making (PVS-Sonderheft 40), 
Wiesbaden, VS-Verlag: 367-88; S. Lavenex, et. al. (2009) “Modes of external 
governance: a cross-national and cross-sectoral comparison”, op. cit., pages 815-16; 
S. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009), ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: 
theorizing external governance in European politics’, op. cit., pages 796-800. 
13 Ib. 
14 S. Lavenex, et. al. (2009) “Modes of external governance: a cross-national and 
cross-sectoral comparison”, op. cit., page 815. 
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Institutionalization refers to the organizational settings that are linked to 
external governance modes, and varies according to the centralization of 
institutions, the density of interactions, and the exclusiveness of the 
agenda. Mechanisms of external governance pertain to the ways in which 
the EU seeks to extend its regulatory and organizational boundaries to 
third countries, and varies from harmonization, through coordination to 
competition. External governance structures that emerge between the EU 
and third countries may vary in these four dimensions. Ideal types depict 
these differences and range from more legalized, asymmetrical 
interactions with little room for ‘the ruled’ to negotiate (hierarchy), 
through more horizontal process-oriented modes of interaction 
(networks) to very loose, informal and decentralised interactions between 
political units in which systems of rules have a low centrality (markets). 
Table 1 summarizes the specific features of these ideal types. 
While these analytical dimensions help to describe what external 
governance modes are and how they work, they do help to explain how 
external modes of governance do emerge. In this respect, the literature 
offers some remarkable insights and posits that modes of external 
governance are shaped by existing EU institutions.15 By taking a 
structuralist and functionalist view, here, the EU is seen as a 
conglomerate of sectoral policy regimes. Going even further, scholars 
have shown that sectoral modes of external governance generally reflect 
the corresponding sectoral modes of internal governance.16 Three are the 
main reasons why the EU sticks to sectoral modes of internal 
governance: existing institutions provide a template for action in 
uncertain policy contexts, or enjoy high legitimacy or might appear as an 
efficient solution for specific policy problems.17  
However, behind and within existing EU institutions there might be 
more than meets the eye. What the literature did not asked is who might 
orient EU external governance towards internal modes of governance and 
for what purposes. What is the role of actors in the emergence of external 
governance structures, and what are the implications of this in the 
resulting scope of EU external governance? Do member states seek to 
mould specific aspects of external governance in order to defend their 
own interests? Do the Commission seek to expand its competences via 
external governance? Given the structural and often a-political focus of 
                                                 
15 Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009), ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: 
theorizing external governance in European politics’, op.cit., page 802. 
16 S. Lavenex, et. al. (2009), ‘Modes of external governance: a cross-national and 
cross-sectoral comparison’, op. cit.  
17 Supra, footnote 15. 
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external governance, this specific agency-dimension has been inevitably 
neglected so far.  
To explain the emergence of external governance modes and the role 
of agency therein, this section develops a structurationist perspective on 
external governance. This way of portraying external governance is 
justified by the fact that much of its institutionalist theoretical 
underpinning is based on the relationship between structure and agency. 
When it comes to the epistemological choice of how to explain the 
structure-agency relationship,18 traditional external governance analysis 
takes on a structuralist position which sees structures as emerging 
through functionalist dynamics and constraining agency and the 
boundaries of interaction. Instead, a structurationist perspective offers a 
relational solution to the epistemological roots of external governance 
theorising that actors are capable to mould structures which in turn 
constrain agency and the resulting courses of interaction. This 
perspective allows for gaining a sense of understanding on agency in 
external governance, and links up with the structure-dimension which has 
been extensively theorised in the extant literature.  
This paper therefore applies to two structurationist-based 
institutionalist accounts: rational choice and historical institutionalism.19 
Rational choice institutionalism sees EU institutions as equilibrium 
contracts between self-interested member states that in turn alter an 
essential rational choice model of politics. Historical institutionalism 
refers to a specific model of politics in which short-time rationalist 
calculations of strategic actors merge into the cultural dimension of EU 
institutions capturing day-to-day politics, early choices of member states 
and the unintended consequences of their actions as well as the ways in 
which supranational institutions ‘seize policy gaps’ and expand their 
                                                 
18 A. Wendt, “The Agent Structure Problem in International Theory”, in A., 
Linklater (2000), International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science, 
Routledge, London: 499-534. See also B. Rosamond (2000), Theories of European 
Integration, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, pages 121, 204. 
19 P. Hall and R. Taylor (1996), “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, 44: 936-58. 19 S. J. Bulmer (1997), “New 
Institutionalism, The Single Market and EU Governance”, in ARENA Working 
Papers 97/25. G. Peters (1998), Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New 
Institutionalism’, Pinter, London. K. Thelen (1999), “Historical institutionalism in 
comparative politics”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2: 369-404. P. Pierson 
(1996), “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis”, 
Comparative Political Studies no. 29, 1996, pp. 123-163. P. Pierson (2000), 
“Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics”, American 
Political Science Review, 94(2): 251-67. 
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competences. In sum, they explain policy-making and the very politics of 
interaction are seen as an iterative, cumulative and incremental process 
whose outcomes are rarely optimal. Although the EU most often does not 
speak with one voice in its external relations, a set of public and private 
actors (i.e. member state governments, sub-units of member state 
administrations, the Commission, non-state actors, and transnational 
networks) directly or indirectly participate in the formation of EU 
sectoral regimes as well as in EU foreign policy-making.20 On the basis 
of these approaches, this paper puts forwards the following hypotheses 
concerning what happens within and behind existing EU institutions: 
(a) Within a given interdependence context between political units 
and a pre-determined institutional environment (i.e. the internal mode of 
governance in a given domain) at a given time (t+1), member states 
bump in EU institutional venues act strategically and seek to mould 
peculiar aspects of external governance structures according to their own 
sectoral preferences. Their choices are the result of similar initial 
preferences, trade-offs and package deals, and in turn have an impact 
upon the resulting sectoral patterns of external governance – which 
enable certain courses of interaction and constrain other courses of 
interaction between the EU and third countries. 
(b) Furthermore, the Commission can influence sectoral modes of 
external governance in more subtle ways. Taking advantage of the policy 
gaps generated by past institutional choices, the Commission might use 
existing EU rules as an internally high legitimate, problem-efficient 
template for external action with the objective of carving out a role for 
itself in sectoral dynamics of external governance and expanding its 
visibility as well as capacity as an international actor. This in turn may 
facilitate the continuity between internal and external modes of sectoral 
governance. By doing so, the Commission may also try to avoid the 
weakening of internal processes of sectoral integration – which in many 
fields are strictly related to external environments (i.e. energy, migration, 
etc.). 
(c) Going a step behind what happens within EU existing 
institutions: in policy fields that feature a high technical component, 
national policy-makers may take into particular account specific sectors 
of member state administrations (i.e. technocrats) and civil society (i.e. 
scientists, interest groups) which have relatively strong resources (i.e. 
know-how, technology, private capitals) to influence the national 
preference formation. Although this aspect is not central to the present 
                                                 
20 For the sake of clarity, here the focus is on the internal formation of rules and 
organizational settings with external governance purposes. 
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analysis, this paper looks at external governance modes with an eye on 
that too. 
 
3. Through the prism: the Mediterranean Solar Plan as a 
market mode of external governance 
Although renewable energy investment towards the Middle East and 
Africa increased from $0,2 billion in 2004 to $2,5 billion in 2009,21 this 
continent still accounts for less than 1 percent of the global total 
investment in 2009.22 More exactly, the largest part of this investment 
within the whole continent went to Egypt with $490 million for a 200 
Megawatt wind project in the Gulf of El Zayt, jointly funded by the 
European Investment Bank and German development bank KfW.23 In 
other words, massive investments will be needed for the deployment of 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Closing the EU-MPCs regulatory gap-
problem means to reduce (non-economic) regulatory risks and create the 
right conditions for leveraging vast investment towards the 
Mediterranean region. 
To disentangle the dynamics of emergence, potential and limits of 
the Mediterranean Solar Plan as a mode of external governance, this 
section traces the continuities and discontinuities between the internal 
mode of energy governance, the prevailing external mode of energy 
governance in the Mediterranean region and the specific mode of 
interaction under which the MSP is framed. The empirical analysis refers 
to the period between 1995 and 2010 and is based on data from several 
sources, including official documents, technical reports, media articles, 
literature as well as semi-structured elite interviews24 conducted in 
Belgium, Turkey, Morocco and Spain in 2009 and 2010. Empirical 
observations are evaluated through the theoretical prism of external 
governance. 
 
Internal modes of energy governance 
Energy is a policy field in which the lack of a permissive consensus and 
related divergent interests among member states traditionally precluded 
                                                 
21 United Nations Environment Programme (2010), Global trends in sustainable 
energy investment 2010: Analysis of the trends and issues in the financing of 
renewable energy and Energy efficiency, UNEP-Division of Technology, Industry 
and Economics, Paris page 19.  
22 Ibidem, page 51. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 Interviewees were guaranteed full anonymity. 
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the transfer of legislative power to the supranational organs. Re-emerged 
at EU level as global problem requiring supranational coordination in the 
late eighties, network forms of interaction arose in the mid-nineties and 
progressively brought to the creation of an enduring EU body of energy 
legislation between 1998 and 2010.  
Network governance of energy, however, is not void of hierarchical 
traits at EU level. In this respect, the European Commission radiates a 
triple shadow of hierarchy over energy governance: the use of the right of 
legislative initiative and, in the case of deadlock, the threat of further 
legislation and of EU competition law.25 Given the silence of the Treaties 
as well as the opposition of member states to any major developments in 
this field, the Commission forged a specific modus operandi in order to 
lock energy issues in overlapping policy areas falling under its legislative 
competence.26 This made the inclusion of the energy sector into the 
Single Market agenda a reality. Similarly, the Commission reframed 
energy issues under environmental and external relations policies. 
Exploiting its formal and informal powers, for a decade and a half the 
Commission played a pivotal role in the creation of the so called energy 
related acquis.  
For good or for worse, the role of member states (and primarily the 
Franco-German axis) is also very determinant in the formation of EU 
energy governance and confirms that governance and government play 
complementary roles in the policy process.27 In this respect, more recent 
developments deserve specific attention. In response to increasing energy 
insecurity and climate change concerns, the 2006 Commission’s Green 
Paper set out a three-fold strategy to build up an energy policy for Europe 
which identified three main objectives for both the internal and external 
activities: energy sustainability, competitiveness and security.28 Under 
the German semester of presidency (January-July 2007), the Union 
adopted an integrated energy and climate change policy approach at the 
European Council in March 2007. In this, the German government made 
use of all its resources and seized the opportunity of the presidency 
semester to act as a breaker. Even after that, it closely followed and 
sought to influence the negotiations on the climate action and renewable 
                                                 
25 B. Eberlein (2008), ‘The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay 
of Governance and Government’, Journal of Public Policy, 28(1): 73-92. 
26 See J. Matláry (1997), Energy Policy in the European Union, San Martin´s Press, 
New York. 
27 B. Eberlein (2008), op. cit. 
28 European Commission (2006), Green paper, A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, COM (2006) 105, Brussels. 
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energy legislative package (CARE) - later approved in April 2009 - 
which were aimed at establishing new EU-level policies to reach the 
2020 targets. In a similar vein, France and Germany markedly influenced 
the final outcome of negotiations on the third directive29 on the 
liberalisation of the gas and electricity markets.30 
At the end of the day, the competences of the Commission are still 
limited, intra-EU energy integration is slowly progressing and the EU 
does not speak with one voice in its external energy relations. 
Nevertheless, an EC energy regulatory framework already exists thus 
providing the templates for the externalization of sectoral governance to 
third countries. But, who exactly is interested in its externalization and 
what are the implications of this for external governance? 
Only recently, the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty established a 
legal basis for a shared competence between the Union and its member 
states on energy. Energy is to become a more communitarised domain, 
and the introduction of decision making by qualified majority is having 
and will have a remarkable weight. 
 
External modes of energy governance in the Mediterranean region 
In line with the institutionalist hypothesis argued in the literature, this 
sub-section illustrates that internal network governance of energy 
generally shaped the external mode of energy governance in the 
Mediterranean region and sheds some light on the role of the 
Commission in this respect.31  
Until the late nineties and early years of the new century, i.e. when 
EU energy rules were at best in a nascent phase, the Commission did not 
go beyond mere attempts at exporting its energy principles to MPCs 
mainly through the Energy Charter Treaty32 and the Euro-Mediterranean 
                                                 
29 As they also did in the first and second directive. 
30 Euractiv (2009), ‘Liberalising EU energy sector’, 7 July, available at 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/liberalising-eu-energy-sector/article-145320 
(last accessed on 12 January 2011). See B. Eberlein (2008), op. cit. 
31 Turkey is included in the study of external governance of energy in the 
Mediterranean. Although mainly involved in the accession process, Turkey is part of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and related energy sectoral programmes; is a 
member of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Solar Plan. 
32 Apart from Turkey which is a full member, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and 
the Palestinian National Authority are simply observers. For reviews, see A. 
Konoplyanik and T. Wälde (2006), ‘Energy Charter Treaty and its role in 
international energy, Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law, 24(4): 523-58. 
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Energy Partnership.33 But, the more the EU developed its energy rules the 
more the Commission made use of them as templates for external energy 
action towards EU peripheries.34 With the advent of the enlargement 
rounds and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and particularly 
after the adoption of the second legislative package on the liberalisation 
of the gas and electricity markets in 2003, external energy “cooperation” 
upgraded to truly external “governance”.35 While enlargement represents 
a typical case of hierchical external governance by conditionality,36 
attempts at norm-expansion in the neighbourhood mainly take the shapes 
of functional cooperation. At bilateral level, process-oriented forms of 
interaction are generally in place across the Mediterranean 
neighbourhood being they mainly based on soft-law ENP action plans 
under the Commission’s political monitoring. From the neighbours’ point 
of view, great importance is attached on keeping sectoral cooperation on 
an equal footing.37 Interactions between sectoral governance agents are 
medium and decentralised.38  
In two specific cases (Morocco and Turkey), energy network 
governance structures are in process to be further developed. (a) After 
earning an ENP advanced status, the European Commission and Morocco 
signed a joint political declaration on the priorities for energy cooperation 
in July 2007. Morocco was even included in EU level energy structures 
such as Intelligent Energy Europe39 through which the Union seeks to 
promote institutional and regulatory change and pursues more horizontal, 
flexible and subtle forms of partial sectoral integration below the 
                                                 
33 Launched in the framework of the Barcelona Process, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Energy Partnership was created in 1997. Two were the main institutional structures: 
the Ministerial conferences and the Energy forum at the level of general directors. 
Cooperation was organised on the basis of three Action Plans (1998-2002; 2003-
2007; 2008-2013). The resulting institutionalization was low, with a decentralized 
and ad-hoc organizational structures. The character of cooperation was purely 
political and results were uneven.  
34 Interviews, EU 31-36. 
35 See European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission. On the 
development of energy policy for the enlarged European Union, its neighbours and 
partner countries, COM(2003) 262 final/ 2, Brussels.  
36 See F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (2004), ‘Governance by conditionality: 
EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal 
of European Public Policy, 11(4): 661-79.  
37 Interview, Morocco 12-30. 
38 Interviews, Morocco 12, 25, 26; Interview, EU 33, 45. 
39 European Commission and Morocco (2007), Joint Declaration on priorities for 
energy cooperation between the European Union and Morocco, Brussels, page 3. 
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threshold of membership.40 (b) Although involved in the accession 
process, in late 2008 EU-Turkey energy cooperation switched from 
hierarchical to more horizontal modes of interaction in order to overcome 
the lack of an EU strong competence in the energy security sub-field,41 
the politicization of negotiations on the energy accession chapter 
opening42 and the political impasse on Turkey-Cyprus off-shore oil 
exploration.43 While the politicization of negotiations still hinders the 
energy chapter opening, there is evidence that process-oriented network 
governance can have positive effects: horizontal bilateral coordination 
between the European Commission and Turkey on Nabucco has 
positively contributed to build a ‘sense of trust’ between high-level 
officials.44 As a result of this,45 in September 2009 the Commission 
started negotiations with Turkey upon accession to the Energy 
Community Treaty which will be of particular importance in further 
advancing regulatory alignment with EU energy rules.46 
Algeria constitutes a highly relevant exception to the continuity 
between internal and external modes of sectoral governance. Its position 
as a key North African gas exporter to Europe, the related high 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the Union as well as its willingness to achieve 
a more beneficial treatment by the EU led to a different pattern of 
interaction that is denominated as strategic energy partnership.47 In a 
similar vein, Egypt positions itself towards a mid-way approach which 
focuses on deepening bilateral energy dialogues while being involved in 
more horizontal programmes and process-oriented modes of interaction. 
Again, the Egyptian interests in becoming a key gas provider through the 
Arab gas pipeline explain this mid-way solution. These cases show that 
                                                 
40 L. Carafa (2010), ‘How far does the European Union influence energy sector 
reform in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries?: Insights from the case of 
energy sustainability’, Paper presented at the Second Euro-Mediterranean University 
ReSouk conference, Barcelona, 14 June 2010. 
41 Interview, EU 37. 
42 Interview , Turkey 4. 
43 L. Carafa (2010), ‘When the birds fly together. Analysing conditions of rule 
extension in the context of EU-Turkey energy cooperation’, ECPR Standing Group 
on the EU Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Porto, 23-26 June 2010. 
44 Interview, Turkey 7. 
45 Ib. 
46 European Commission (2009), Turkey 2009 Progress Report, SEC(2009)1334, 
Brussels, 14 October 2009, page 59. 
47 H. Darbouche (2008), ‘Decoding Algeria’s ENP Policy: Differentiation by other 
means’, Mediterranean Politics, 13(3): 371-89. 
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the institutionalist hypothesis alone does not account for these 
developments. Here, power considerations take centre stage and 
demonstrate that avenues for horizontal cooperation end when EU rules 
confront geopolitics of energy. This is the key reason why the 
Commission and big energy producers generally engage themselves in 
more bilateral forms of market governance with a loose and blurred focus 
on EU rules.  
ENP-based network governance structures do not only emerge at 
bilateral level but consolidate also at regional and sub-regional level. 
Here, functional cooperation takes the shape of information networks, i.e. 
networks that serves to diffuse policy-relevant knowledge, best practices 
and ideas among the members.48 In September 2006, the Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Forum held in Brussels at the level of general 
directors re-launched the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership. The 
Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of Limassol of December 
2007 was indeed a turning point for energy cooperation at regional level. 
A set of regional and sub-regional EC programmes were reinforced and 
re-framed under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI) since 2007: the Euro-Arab Mashreq Gas Market 
(EAMGM I and II), Electricity Market Integration (IMMELECT), 
Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Programme (MED-EMIP), 
Energy Efficiency in Construction (MED-ENEC I and II) and 
Mediterranean Regulators (MED-REG I and II). Given its position 
between the Mediterranean and the Caspian Sea, Turkey is also part of 
the Baku Initiative and Inogate sub-regional programmes. The overall 
amount allocated to the Mediterranean region in the period 2007-2010 
was €342 million of which about €33 million was earmarked only for 
energy information networks, thus representing about a 10 percent of the 
total.49 Interestingly, transgovernmental forms of technical assistance that 
were initially devised to facilitate legislative approximation, regulatory 
convergence and institution-building in the accession countries, i.e. 
Twinning, TAIEX (Technical Assistance and Information Exchanges) 
and SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and 
                                                 
48 Lavenex, S. (2008), ‘A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood 
policy: integration beyond conditionality?’, ib., page 943. 
49 European Commission (2008), Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Regional co-
operation: an overview of programmes and projects, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-
cooperation/documents/infonotes_enpisouth_regional_cooperation_en.pdf (accessed 
on 1 March 2010). 
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Management),50 were extended to the eastern and southern 
neighbourhood with the advent of the ENP. However, specific activities 
in the energy sector remain still limited - accounting for a 4 percent of 
TAIEX activities between 2006-2010, and a 4.4 percent of Twinning 
projects between 2004-2010 with an average of 1.5 projects per year - 
and were mostly directed to the eastern neighbourhood (particularly to 
Ukraine).51  
To this end, the completion of the Single energy market (both as a 
regulatory, institutional and physically interconnected space) is still 
ongoing, and the energy acquis is a moving output within an evolving 
policy-making process with prospects for further communitarisation after 
the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the specific role played 
by the Commission generally assured the continuation of internal modes 
of energy governance in external governance. Became aware of the 
reasons for the success of the enlargement machinery, i.e. the acquis 
communataire as a key instrument of external influence,52 the 
Commission used external relations’ policies to externalize energy rules 
as well as policy-making structures and consequently gained a role as an 
interlocutor with third countries and private companies which goes well 
beyond its formal institutional role in the energy field. Another clear 
example of the Commission’s activism is the establishment of the Energy 
Community Treaty for the South-East Europe, which constitutes a 
hierarchical form of interaction based on treaty commitment to EU 
energy acquis and equipped with a set of organizational structures 
(Ministerial Council, Permanent High Level Group, Regulatory Board) as 
well as a Vienna-based Secretariat ensuring the day-to-day activities.53 
Interestingly, the launching of the Mediterranean Solar Plan opens up 
new windows of opportunity for cooperation with third countries in the 
southern neighbourhood. Yet, it remains an opened question on if the 
                                                 
50 SIGMA is a joint initiative of the EU and the OECD, however principally 
financed by the EU. 
51 Interview, EU 32, 35. European Commission (2009), Activity Report – Twinning 
TAIEX and SIGMA within the ENPI, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/documents/activity_re
port_2009_en.pdf (accessed on 1 March 2010). 
52 A. Magen (2007), ‘Transformative Engagement through Law: The Acquis 
Communautaire as an Instrument of EU External Influence’, European Journal of 
Law Reform, 9(3): 361-92. 
53 S. Renner (2009), “The Energy Community of Southeast Europe: A neo-
functionalist project of regional integration”, European Integration online Papers, 
13, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2009_001a (last 
accessed on 1 March 2011). 
 17
Mediterranean Solar Plan follows these network patterns of external 
governance and to what extent it structurally addresses the EU-MPCs 
regulatory gap-problem. 
 
The specific mode of external governance behind the MSP 
This sub-section illustrates the existence of a discontinuity between the 
internal-external mode of sectoral governance and the specific mode of 
interaction under which the Mediterranean Solar Plan is framed. It 
explains this discrepancy by arguing that early choices of key member 
states within the making of the UfM impacted upon the resulting mode of 
external governance – facts that ultimately constrain the potential and 
limits of the Mediterranean Solar Plan to reduce the existing regulatory 
gap between the EU and MPCs. To do so, it refers to the MSP in a more 
systematic way. That is, studying the MSP as a mode of governance 
means analysing the whole process and specific actor constellation which 
led to its emergence and the role actors therein. 
Behind the solar plan there is the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable 
Energy Cooperation Network (TREC) – a partnership between the Club 
of Rome, the Hamburg Climate Protection Foundation and the National 
Energy Research Centre of Jordan founded in 2003. In collaboration with 
scientists of the German Aerospace Centre (DLR), this transnational 
elite-driven initiative developed the well known Desertec concept, i.e. a 
vision of a European Union-Middle East and North Africa (EU-MENA) 
community of shared clean energy and water interests. In Germany, the 
Desertec concept gained increasing political support thanks of the Greens 
and was propelled by domestic pioneering renewable energy industry. 
During the German presidency semester (January-July 2007), the 
Desertec project become increasingly attractive since European leaders 
approved a EU-wide target to reach cover 20 percent of their national 
energy needs from renewable energy sources at the European Council in 
March 2007. Germany took advantage of its formal role and weight in 
the Union to reach the above political agreement at the European Council 
level and propelled the negotiations process that brought to the adoption 
of the CARE legislative package in April 2009. Among the pieces 
included in the CARE,54 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the 
                                                 
54 The CARE includes the following main directives: directive 2009/29/EC to 
improve the greenhouse gas emission trading scheme of the community, directive 
2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide, directive 2009/28/EC on 
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, regulation 443/2009/EC 
setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the 
community’s integrated approach to reduce CO2 emissions from light-duty vehicles. 
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use of energy from renewable sources stands out in the present case. In 
detail, Article 9 allows member states to import green electricity from 
third countries.  
Interestingly, two important facts occurred between March 2007 and 
April 2009. First, a White Book for Desertec55 was presented at the 
European Parliament in November 2007, and the Desertec concept begun 
to receive increasing support in Brussels. Second, not only Germany 
played an important role in this process. Keeping its electoral promise, 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy paved the idea of a Mediterranean 
Union (exclusively between the Southern European countries and the 
MPCs) which was intended to be formalised during the French 
presidency semester (January-July 2008). But, Germany firmly opposed 
to this proposal that was to exclude the EU and its Northern member 
states. Finally, a deal between Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel was reached in Hanover in March 2008.56 Hence, the Union for 
the Mediterranean was launched at the Paris summit in July 2008. The 
initiative was linked to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership so to bring 
the EU back in. As the price for German support on this initiative, France 
included in UfM’ Joint Declaration a commitment to develop a 
Mediterranean Solar Plan.57 However, behind the political level there is 
more than meets the eye. German high officials initially wanted the EU’s 
MSP to play a pivotal role in promoting regulatory convergence between 
two sides of the Mediterranean. Instead, French technocrats were rather 
oriented towards a more pragmatic approach58 which particularly 
resembles to what the literature on transition management describes as 
niche-based transition.59 To succeed, in other words, the MSP initially 
requires niche-pilot projects protected from the dominant fossil fuel-
electricity production regime. If these pilot projects are successful, they 
can provoke a wider change so that a meso-level policy regime would 
                                                 
55 Desertec Foundation (2008), White Book – Clean Power from Deserts: The 
Desertec Concept for Energy, Water and Climate Security, available 
http://www.desertec.org/fileadmin/downloads/DESERTEC-
WhiteBook_en_small.pdf (last accessed 12 January 2011). 
56 Euractiv (2008), ‘Germany and France reach agreement on Mediterranean Union’, 
March 5, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/germany-france-
reach-agreement-mediterranean-union/article-170739 (last accessed on 12 January 
2011). 
57 M. Mason (2009), op. cit., page 3. 
58 Interview, EU 34. 
59 M. Mason (2009), op. cit. 
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consolidate. While this strategy makes theoretical sense, its empirical 
validity is largely questioned.60 
What is, however, striking is that these early choices made by 
member states and their administrative sub-units within the making of the 
UfM indeed had an impact on the resulting sectoral mode of external 
governance under which the MSP is framed. While network forms of 
energy governance generally prevail at EU level as well as in the 
Mediterranean region, the MSP constitutes a very loosely 
institutionalized form of market governance in which conflicts of 
interests are mainly solved at interstate level. So far, the German 
government has been the main European interlocutor with individual 
MPCs. This was clear especially in the recent case of Algeria. In June 
2010, the newly appointed Minister of Energy and Mines Youcef Yousfi 
declared that Algeria would potentially gave up the European solar 
project evaluating the possibility of constructing a solar project on its 
own by collaborating with the Chinese clean energy industry.61 But 
during a visit to Berlin by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika last 
December, Germany and Algeria expressed the political intention to 
cooperate more closely on fossil fuels and renewable energy. 62 Very 
limited instances of network governance are present. The programme 
‘Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan’ – strongly supported 
by the Commission – represents the most relevant but uneven element of 
network governance.63 Established in 2010 with €4.6 million of budget, 
this programme aims to promote EU-MPCs regulatory convergence. 
Although EU rules are promoted as a reference model, their use as basis 
for cooperation as well as its adoption is not binding. Developments in 
individual MPCs are followed through a rather loose technical (rather 
than political) monitoring.64 Interactions are very loosely centralized so 
that, again, this programme emerges as a sort of information network. 
                                                 
60 F. Berkhout (2008), ‘Innovation theory and sociotechnical transitions’, in J. van 
den Bergh, and F. R. Bruinsma (Eds.), Managing the transition to renewable 
energy: Theory and practice from regional and macro perspectives, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar: 129-47. 
61 Solar Feeds (2010), ‘China Solar Stocks May Profit from Algeria’s Desertec 
Rejection’, 30 July, available at http://www.solarfeeds.com/clean-energy-
sector/13656-china-solar-stocks-may-profit-from-algerias-desertec-rejection 
(accessed on 12 January 2011). 
62 NewEurope (2010), ‘Germany, Algeria to cooperate on solar energy, oil & gas’, 
12 December, available at http://www.neurope.eu/articles/103836.php (accessed on 
12 January 2011). 
63 Interview, EU 34-37. 
64 Interview, EU 34. 
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The Commission also supports the MSP through its financial 
commitment to FEMIP (the European Investment Bank’s Facility for 
Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership) and the Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility.  
Furthermore, recent events do not indicate any further development 
towards network governance. In February 2010, an ad-hoc experts group 
examined a strategy paper for the Mediterranean Solar Plan which was 
subsequently endorsed by the Ministers of Energy and heads of 
delegation of the Union for the Mediterranean member states at the sixth 
Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Energy and Renewable 
Energy held in Cairo on 2-3 June 2010.65 In this occasion, Ministers and 
heads of delegation also called on the Secretariat to develop a ‘master 
plan’ that will define the guidelines for the large scale deployment of 
renewable energy project under the MSP to be delivered in June 2012 the 
latest.66 After this preparation stage, it hence will begin the deployment 
phase of the MSP (2012-2020) which will follow a specific road map 
contained in the master plan - detailing the phases, activities and precise 
timeline for the implementation of the MSP. 67 According to the MSP’s 
stategy paper, the master plan should develop an approach covering 
(among others) the progress of legislative and regulatory reforms for a 
phased development of renewable energy technology in MPCs.68 
However, the division of labour between the Secretariat and the experts 
working on the programme ‘Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar 
Plan’ on this respect is still unclear – thus pointing to an urgent need for a 
thorough coordination between the Secretariat and all experts involved in 
the regional platforms mentioned in the previous sub-section. 
More importantly, the MSP constitutes by now a specific mode of 
external governance in which outcomes are the result of inter-MPCs 
competition over external funding. This paper shows evidence that 
competition mechanisms at best unleashes a reform dynamic in which 
MPCs undertake partial regulatory and institutional reforms in order to 
lock in external funding and long-term power purchase agreements. Yet, 
outcomes are rarely optimal and EU rules do not constitute the point of 
reference in these limited processes. In this respect, Morocco is a telling 
case. The new windows of opportunity opened by the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan have recently triggered a specific domestic reform pattern 
                                                 
65 Council of the European Union (2010), Note from the General Secretariat of the 
Council to Delegations, 9558/10, Brussels, 7 May. 
66 Ib., page 7. 
67 Ib., page 13. 
68 Ib.  
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which aims to tapping the large solar and wind potential at disposal and 
‘seize the day’ of increasing external funding devoted to renewable 
projects by development banks and international donors. With the 
Renewable Energy Law of 2010,69 Morocco set out a legislative 
framework for the promotion of renewable investments, establishing a 
procedure for the authorization of renewable energy installations as well 
as regulating the production, distribution, trade and even the export of 
green electricity. While financial incentives to renewable energy 
producers were still under discussion in the parliament in October 2010, a 
feed-in tariffs model is not yet established by law.70 Additionally, 
Morocco underwent two relevant institutional reforms in the same year. 
First, a Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy was created by law with the 
mandate to undertake economic and technical feasibility studies, promote 
the national activities to the foreign investors and donor community and 
operate as key contractor for solar energy projects.71 Second, the pre-
existing Centre for the Development of Renewable Energy was 
transformed by law in to a technical institutional structure re-named as 
National Agency for the Promotion of Renewable Energy and Energy 
Conservation with the specific mandate to supervise and coordinate 
renewable energy and energy efficiency programmes at national and sub-
national level.72 Two reasons account for this domestic reform pattern. 
(a) In this country, the renewable sub-sector reform trajectory builds 
upon a highly positive past experience, i.e. the General Programme for 
Rural Electrification (1994-2010). A country with modest financial 
resources to cope with complex energy infrastructure projects, Morocco 
was able to meet the sufficient legislative and technical standards 
required at international level as to obtain significant international 
cooperation financial support for the above programme.73 This positive 
past experience raised the consciousness of national elites and 
technocrats in the fact that the donor community may fund projects and 
help leveraging private investment only if governments take action and 
                                                 
69 Ministry of Energy, Mining Water and Environment (2010a), Loi no. 1309 
relative aux énergies renouvelables, 11 February 2010. 
70 See K. Fritzsche, et. al. (2011), ‘The relevance of global energy governance for 
Arab countries: The case of Morocco’, Energy Policy, article in press, available at 
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.11.042 (accessed on 11 February 2011) 
71 Ministry of Energy, Mining Water and Environment (2010c), Loi no. 5709 sur la 
création de la Société Moroccan Agency For Solar Energy, 14 January 2010. 
72 Ministry of Energy, Mining Water and Environment (2010b), Loi no. 1609 
relative a l’agence nationale pour le développement des énergies renouvelables et de 
l’efficacité énergétique, 13 January 2010. 
73 Interview, Morocco 13. 
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demonstrate sufficient regulatory and technical capacity.74 (b) Lacking 
the hydrocarbons reserves of its neighbours, Morocco currently imports 
94,6% of its energy.75 Demand is expected to nearly quadruplicate by 
2030.76 As a result, Morocco has an ‘urgent need’ to develop its 
renewable energy capacity and, under the current national energy 
strategy, intend to cover up to 15% of Morocco’s energy mix from 
renewable sources by 2020.77  
To end, the empirical analysis highlights a picture in which the fuzzy 
nature of EU foreign policy-making and the role of member states therein 
had a remarkable impact on the resulting sectoral mode of governance in 
the Mediterranean region – thus enabling and constraining specific 
patterns of interaction between the EU and MPCs. These dynamics have 
striking implications in the case of the Mediterranean Solar Plan. 
Although the MSP points to mid/ long-term objectives – a wide 
renewable energy transition in the Mediterranean region by 2020 and 
2050 – early choices of national governments operating within short-time 
horizons have produced unintended consequences. At the end of the day, 
emerging market governance heavily constrains the boundaries of 
interaction so that the solar plan is unlikely to go beyond a ‘reform by 
contract’ model in the best case. External governance by ‘competitive 
pressure’ is not sufficient to provoke a wide renewable energy transition 
in the Mediterranean region and is hardly steerable. Thus, a far more 
‘coordinated’ pressure is needed to overcome the EU-MCNs regulatory 
barriers behind the implementation of the solar plan. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The academia and policy making are generally regarded as two distinct 
worlds. Effort by scholars and practitioners is often disconnected and 
dispersed. However, theory has the potential to illuminate different sets 
of empirical facts. This may help policy-makers to take well-informed 
decisions. Moreover, empirical analysis is the ground in which theory can 
be tested and further developed. Guided by these beliefs, this paper has 
sought to bridge over theory and policy with the objective of (i) 
contributing to the debate on external governance and (ii) advancing the 
                                                 
74 Ibidem. 
75 Interview, Morocco 19. 
76 Ibidem. 
77 Interview, Morocco 12-15. 
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debate on the state and prospects for a renewable energy transition in the 
Mediterranean region. 
This paper has investigated the emergence of the Mediterranean 
Solar Plan as an external mode of sectoral governance and the role of 
agency therein. Importantly, this paper has scrutinized the implications of 
this in external governance and the resulting capacity of the solar plan to 
thoroughly manage the EU-MPCs regulatory gap-problem and boost a 
wide institutional and regulatory reform dynamic in this region. Three 
outcomes are easy to detect. (a) Although network forms of energy 
governance generally prevail in the EU and the Mediterranean region, the 
MSP emerges as a very loosely institutionalized form of market 
governance in which political interaction and outcomes are the result of 
inter-MPCs competition over external funding. (b) Competitive pressure 
at best unleashes a reform dynamic in which individual MPCs undertake 
partial regulatory and institutional reforms in order to lock in external 
funding and long-term power purchase agreements. In other words, 
market governance heavily constrains the boundaries of action and 
interaction so that the MSP can not go beyond the model of ‘reform by 
contract’. (c) The discontinuity between the internal-external mode of 
energy governance and the specific MSP’s sectoral mode of external 
governance is attributed to early choices of key member states (France 
and Germany) within the making of the UfM which ultimately impacted 
on the resulting sectoral patterns of external governance, thus 
constraining the potential and limits of the Mediterranean Solar Plan to 
reduce the EU-MPCs regulatory gap. 
What do these findings imply for the policy debate on the 
Mediterranean Solar Plan? This paper shows that external governance by 
competitive pressure is far to provoke a wide renewable energy transition 
in the Mediterranean region. These findings highlight the need for EU-
MENA renewable cooperation to move on more institutionalised and 
coordinated forms of interaction. What do these findings imply for 
external governance theory? This paper points out two avenues for 
further research. First, the role of member states and its impact on 
sectoral modes of external governance undoubtedly merit to be further 
explored. Second, the proposed structurationist perspective on external 
governance deserves attention and could further explain the continuities 
but also the discontinuities between the internal and external modes of 
governance across countries, regions and policy fields. To conclude, this 
paper also points out that external governance theories demonstrate to be 
well-suited not only to ‘causally’ explaining the disaggregated and 
sectorally differentiated scope of EU external relations and power. 
External governance also suites well for analyzing the structural potential 
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and limits of a given sectoral mode of interaction between the EU and 
third countries. 
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